Quality of audit committee as a moderating effect between shareholding structure and intellectual capital disclosure in Indonesian banking companies

Abstract

This research examines the nexus of shareholding structure on intellectual capital disclosure. The shareholding structure consists of management, institutions, government, and foreigners. Furthermore, this research investigates the moderating role of the quality of the audit committee in this relationship. This research design uses quantitative methods. The population consists of banking firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2016-2020. The selection of samples employing the purposive sampling method obtained 159 observations. The output of hypothesis testing using moderated regression analysis (MRA) shows that managerial and institutional ownership negatively impacts the disclosure of intellectual capital. The conclusion of this research is that shareholders tend to reduce the amount of intellectual capital disclosed. The test results also prove that share ownership by management, institutions, and the government can function as a management control mechanism if a qualified audit committee supports it. The findings serve as input for the Financial Services Authority; as the party that drafts regulations related to the formation and implementation guidelines of the audit committee’s work. Therefore, managers should integrate intellectual capital information with financial information; so that it is more useful for users of information for decision making. Practical implications of this research are that banking companies in Indonesia can improve the quality of their audit committees so that there is an increase in intellectual capital disclosure.